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JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS LEAVING ATTORNEY'S FEES
ISSUES UNDECIDED: A FINAL JUDGMENT?
INTRODUCTION
In this era of proliferating and high-cost litigation,' parties increas-
ingly are turning to the myriad exceptions to the American rule that a
litigant must bear his own attorney's fees.2 For example, parties that
prevail at trial may seek attorney's fees from their opponents under many
federal statutes that contain fee-shifting provisions.3 Courts also possess
an inherent power to assess fees against those who bring bad faith
claims.4 Similarly, when an attorney fails to conduct a reasonable in-
quiry into the merits of a case, the court may sanction him by requiring
that he pay his opponent's fees.' Contracting parties also may opt out of
the American rule prior to litigation by including a clause that requires
the breaching party to pay the other party's attorney's fees in any action
for breach of contract.6
A determination that the prevailing party is entitled to fees, however,
results in an entirely new series of difficulties. Before they can establish
fee awards, courts often must await the lawyer's submission of detailed
and complicated affidavits describing fees charged and tasks performed.7
1. See Green, From Here to Attorney's Fee Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness in
the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 207, 209 (1984).
2. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
Green, supra note 1, at 209. The escalation of litigation costs, increased use of private
class actions, and growth in public interest litigation have led to an increase in the fre-
quency of attempts to shift attorney's fees. See Green, supra note 1, at 210.
3. See, eg., Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(1982); Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982); Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). For an exhaustive list of statutes that
contain fee-shifting provisions, see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
4. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (citing F.D. Rich Co. v.
United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)).
5. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
6. See, e.g., Bank South Leasing, Inc. v. Williams, 769 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th Cir.)
(per curiam) (clause in lease agreement), vacated on other grounds, 778 F.2d 704 (1985)
(per curiam); Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 780, 790-91 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (promissory note); In Re Intaco Puerto Rico, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1122, 1123-24
(D.P.R. 1973) (same); see also Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38
Rutgers L. Rev. 439, 448 & n.49 (1986) (courts usually uphold attorney's fees liability
provisions in promissory notes).
7. See Metcalf v. Borba, 681 F.2d 1183, 1187 (9th Cir. 1982); Obin v. District No. 9
of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d 574, 579-80 (8th Cit.
1981) (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 629 F.2d 697,
702-03 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445 (1982)); see also Beckwith
Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 1987) (Gibbons, CJ.,
dissenting) ("litigation over the quantification of attorneys' fees has, since the develop-
ment of the trend away from the American rule, become a very time-consuming
enterprise").
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Moreover, courts have devised extensive lists of factors to consider when
deciding whether to make an award and how to calculate an appropriate
dollar amount." As a result, fee issues are often determined many
months after liability issues have been resolved.9 This delay, when con-
sidered in light of the requirement that a judgment be "final" before it
may be appealed, 0 poses serious problems for litigants who, understand-
ably, wish to expedite the resolution of their disputes by appealing as
early as possible.
The federal courts of appeals disagree whether a decision on the merits
of a case represents a "final" judgment, and thus is appealable, when the
district court has awarded, but not quantified, attorney's fees. 1 They also
conflict on whether a judgment on the merits is final when the court has
reserved fee issues for later consideration altogether.12 Some courts have
fashioned a bright-line rule that a judgment deciding the merits but re-
serving questions regarding attorney's fees is final and appealable because
attorney's fees issues always are collateral to the merits of an action.13
Other courts, however, reject the bright-line rule in favor of a case-by-
8. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (using product of
number of hours spent multiplied by fee per hour charged as starting point for inquiry);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (listing
12 factors).
9. See, eg., Ierna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, 833 F.2d 1472, 1474 (11th Cir. 1987)
(approximately one year between request and district court's entry of award); United
States v. Armendaris, 790 F.2d 860, 863 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (four months
between motion for fees and district court's decision on motion); Alcorn County v. U.S.
Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1163 (5th Cir. 1984) (two-and-one-half months);
Obin v. District No. 9 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 651 F.2d
574, 576 (8th Cir. 1981) (two months).
10. See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
11. Compare Barrington Press, Inc. v. Morey, 816 F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir.) ("reserva-
tion of the determination of the amount of attorney's fees does not deprive the initial
judgment of finality" (citations omitted)), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 249 (1987) with Beck-
with Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1987) (when attor-
ney's fees are integral to the merits, reservation of quantification of a fee award renders
judgment non-final).
12. Compare Bank South Leasing, Inc., v. Williams, 769 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th Cir.
1985) (per curiam) (when fees are integral to merits, reservation of question of fees for
later consideration renders judgment on the merits non-final), vacated on other grounds,
778 F.2d 704 (1985) (per curiam) with International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Orna-
mental & Reinforcing Ironworkers' Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656,
658-59 (9th Cir. 1984) (judgment on the merits is final where court reserves question of
fees for later consideration).
13. See, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155, 157-58 (10th Cir.
1986) (per curiam), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987); United States v. Estridge, 797
F.2d 1454, 1459 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d
286, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1985); Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 792, 795 (6th Cir.
1985); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Ironworkers'
Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1984); Bernstein v.
Menard, 728 F.2d 252, 253 (4th Cir. 1984). See generally Note, Morgan v. Union Metal
Manufacturing: Finality of a Judgment on the Merits When Attorney Fee Issues Remain
Undecided, 17 U. Tol. L. Rev. 579 (1986) (collecting cases and arguing for bright-line
rule).
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case analysis.14 These courts hold that the finality of a judgment that
reserves fee questions depends on whether the issues of attorney's fees are
integral or collateral to the merits of a case. 5 Under this approach, a
judgment reserving fee issues that are collateral to the merits is final and
appealable.16 If, however, fee issues intertwine with the merits, the fee
issues must be resolved before either party may appeal the judgment."
This Note addresses the confusion concerning the determination of the
finality and appealability of a judgment on the merits when attorney's
fees issues await resolution. Part I of this Note briefly summarizes the
final judgment rule and its underlying policies. Part II compares the ar-
guments favoring both the bright-line and case-by-case approaches and
analyzes them in light of the rationales underlying the finality require-
ment. This Note concludes that the policies underlying the final judg-
ment rule compel adoption of the case-by-case analysis.
I. THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE
Discussion of the appealability of cases that are final but for the deter-
mination of attorney's fees issues requires a brief review of the final judg-
ment rule. The federal courts of appeals have statutory jurisdiction to
hear appeals from all final judgments issued by the United States district
14. See eg., erna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1475 (11th Cir. 1987);
Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1235-36 (5th Cir. 1987); Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1987); F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named
Trustees, 776 F.2d 1563, 1564 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott
& Co., 682 F.2d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied 459 U.S. 1107 (1983).
15. See eg., Hooper v. F.D.I.C., 785 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (5th Cir. 1986); Holmes,
682 F.2d at 1146. Courts have held attorney's fees to be integral when they are part of
the scope of relief to be awarded the prevailing party, akin to damages. See Beckwith
Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1987); Holmes, 682 F.2d
at 1147. Courts have deemed attorney's fees issues collateral, however, in cases where
they resemble court costs. See Holmes, 682 F.2d at 1147; McQurter v. City of Atlanta,
724 F.2d 881, 882 (11th Cir. 1984).
16. Sea eg., Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1987) (42 U.S.C. § 1988
fees found collateral); Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 291
n.8 (3d Cir. 1987) (fees awarded pursuant to "separate statute" deemed collateral (citing
West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1983) (§ 1988 fees))); Donaldson v. Clark, 786
F.2d 1570, 1575 (1lth Cir.) (fees awarded under Fed. R. Civ. P. I 1 sanction found collat-
eral), vacated, 794 F.2d 572 (1986) (en banc); McQurter v. Atlanta, 724 F.2d 881, 882
(11th Cir. 1984) (§ 1988 fees found collateral).
17. See eg., Jaffe v. Sundowner Properties, Inc., 808 F.2d 1425, 1427 (11th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (award of fees as sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) for failure to
comply with discovery mechanisms not collateral because it arises from same factual
basis as dismissal of claim); Bank South Leasing, Inc. v. Williams, 769 F.2d 1497, 1500
(11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (fees stipulated in contract found integral to merits of
breach of contract action), vacated on other grounds, 778 F.2d 704 (1985) (per curiam);
C.I.T. Corp. v. Nelson, 743 F.2d 774, 775 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (contractually stipulated fees
integral to merits); Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 682 F.2d 1143, 1147-48 (5th Cir.
1982) (fees awarded under Jones Act "bound hand in hand" with merits), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1107 (1983).
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courts."8 Once a final judgment has been rendered at the trial level, a
party seeking an appeal must file a written notice of appeal with the dis-
trict court within thirty days of the judgment's entry or the right to ap-
peal is lost. 19 Both the finality requirement and the notice limitation are
mandatory and jurisdictional.20 Thus, the courts of appeals have no dis-
cretion to entertain an appeal from a non-final judgment or one that is
filed in an untimely fashion.2'
A final judgment is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. '22 The
court must intend the judgment to be final23 and must contemplate no
further action in the case.24 Despite the apparent simplicity of these defi-
nitions, courts historically have found them difficult to apply.23  One
commentator has suggested that, because courts prefer to give the finality
rule a pragmatic rather than a formal construction, a concrete test has
proved elusive.26 This continued difficulty stands at odds with the need
for jurisdictional rules, such as the final judgment rule, to be explicit and
unambiguous in order to provide guidance for parties that must comply
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). An exception to this rule exists when the Supreme
Court may review directly the district court decision. Id.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Section 2107 permits later
filings of appeal in suits to which the United States is a party and in admiralty cases. 28
U.S.C. § 2107. The section also allows the district court to extend the period for an
additional 30 days when it finds excusable neglect by the filing party. Id. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4 provides similar exceptions and, in addition, allows the filing of
certain post trial motions to toll the 30-day appeal limitation. Fed. R. App. P. 4.
20. See Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978); United
States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960); see also Fed. R. App. Proc. 3(a) ("[flailure
of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not
affect the validity of the appeal .... ." (emphasis added)).
21. See Browder, 434 U.S. at 264-65; Robinson, 361 U.S. at 229. Moreover, a party
need not challenge the appellate court's jurisdiction in her filings; the court may address
the issue sua sponte. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541
(1986); Woodard v. Sage Products, Inc., 818 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Kuster v.
Block, 773 F.2d 1048, 1048 (9th Cir. 1985).
22. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
467 (1978); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R.R. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28-
29 (1883).
23. See United States v. F.& M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232-35 (1958);
Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1985).
24. See F.&M. Schaefer Brewing, 356 U.S. at 232; see also Fort v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 746 F.2d 744, 747 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (order finding party liable for fees without quan-
tifying fees not appealable since it contemplates further proceedings before party's obliga-
tions become final).
25. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) ("No verbal formula
yet devised can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an ut-
terly reliable guide for the future."); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
152 (1964) ("it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming
within what might well be called the 'twilight zone' of finality"). See generally Frank,
Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 Texas L. Rev. 292, 295-96 (1966) (recognizing
imprecise nature of finality requirement).
26. See Frank, supra note 25, at 295-96.
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with such rules or risk forfeiture of their appeal.2 7
The existence of two fundamental, competing policies that underlie the
final judgment rule explains this continued confusion. These conflicting
policy considerations are the prevention of burdensome and costly piece-
meal review, on the one hand, and the lessening of delay in appealing a
judgment, which may deny justice to a party, on the other.' The finality
rule primarily aims to combine into one appeal all issues decided by the
lower court.29 By avoiding the harrassment of and expense to a party
resulting from a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings
incidental to a single litigation, the rule facilitates review of meritorious
claims."0 In addition, requiring appellate courts to review the compo-
nent claims in a single appeal ensures efficient judicial administration.3 '
Recognizing, however, that complex cases often take years to reach
complete resolution,32 Congress and the Supreme Court have crafted ex-
ceptions to the finality rule to afford relief to parties whose rights may be
harmed irreparably by orders that become effectively unreviewable if not
appealed immediately.33 For example, one federal statute grants appel-
late courts jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders issued
by district courts that grant, continue, modify, refuse, or dissolve injunc-
tions. 4 The Supreme Court has created another exception to the final
27. See Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1978);
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155, 157 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam),
cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987); 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal
Practice 1 110.07, at 109 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter Moore].
28. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974); Dickinson v. Petro-
leum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Green, supra note 1, at 215-16.
29. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); see also
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (finality rule "[pro-
motes] efficient judicial administration").
30. See Firestone, 449 U.S. at 374; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325
(1940); see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945) ("elimination of delays
caused by interlocutory appeals" one reason behind finality requirement).
31. See Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233-34; Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325. See generally Moore,
supra note 27, 110.07, at 107-11 (discussing various policies behind finality rule).
32. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 482 (1980) (Rehnqhist, J.,
dissenting) (litigation la,;ting 14 years); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F.2d 628, 629 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (sur petition for rehearing) (civil rights litiga-
tion lasting eight years), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
33. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124-25 (1962) (reviewing various ex-
ceptios to the finality rule).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982). In Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S.
79 (1981), a case in which the plaintiffs alleged employment discrimination, id. at 84, the
Supreme Court held a district court order denying a motion to enter a consent decree
appealable under § 1292(a)(1) because inability to appeal might cost petitioners their
chance to settle the case on their negotiated terms. See id. at 86. Also, because the
essence of the consent decree at issue was to effect a restructuring of the respondent's
transfer and promotion policies, the court found that non-appealability of the district
court's order would lead to irreparable harm caused by respondent's continued discrimi-
nation. See Id. at 89 & n.15.
In Shanks v. City of Dallas, 752 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1985), however, appellant sought
review of the trial court's denial of class certification. Id. at 1093. The court of appeals,
in dictum, distinguished the situation where a party seeks to appeal denial of a prelimi-
19871
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judgment rule, known as the collateral order doctrine.35 Under this doc-
trine, a party may appeal immediately an order that finally determines
important rights yet is too independent of the cause of action itself to
defer appellate review until the whole case has been decided.3 6 These
exceptions ensure that the final judgment rule, by delaying appeal of cer-
tain preliminary or collateral orders, does not unfairly restrict a party's
rights.37 Consistent with this policy, courts have continued to construe
the finality requirement practically, rather than technically, in an effort
to avoid an overemphasis on formalism.38
The Supreme Court also has justified the final judgment rule on the
subsidiary ground that it emphasizes the deference appellate courts prop-
erly should accord to district court judges.39 The Court has expressed
fear that, absent the finality rule, appellate judges constantly would look
nary injunction. See id. at 1096-97. The court noted that because a party seeking a
preliminary injunction must prove an immediate threat of irreparable harm to obtain the
injunction, denial of such an injunction "will necessarily result in the type of serious
consequence that § 1292(a)(1) is designed to prevent." Id. at 1097. Finding the irrepara-
ble harm alleged by appellants "too contingent and remote" to warrant interlocutory
appeal under § 1292(a)(1), the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at
1098.
35. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949); accord
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct. 1177, 1181-82 (1987).
36. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546-47; see, eg., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985) (order denying claim of qualified immunity appealable as a collateral order); Lynk
v. LaPorte Superior Ct. No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 561 (7th Cir. 1986) (order granting or
denying writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum appealable under collateral order
doctrine).
37. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 125-26 (1962). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) provides another exception to the final judgment rule. Rule 54(b) allows
for appeal from a judgment against one or more, but fewer than all, the claims or parties
in circumstances where the judge certifies "that there is no just reason for delay." Id.
The Rule was intended to afford relief to parties involved in litigation that includes multi-
ple claims relating to separate and distinct rights of many persons. See 6 J. Moore, W.
Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 1 54.15[l] at 191-94 (2d ed. 1988). "[I]f
all these determinations had to await an appeal from a decree finally terminating the
proceeding, rights of many persons would either be irreparably lost or seriously impaired
..... " Id. at 191; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1956)
(multiple claim action in which district court's judgment for defendant as to two, but not
all, claims for relief deemed appealable under Rule 54(b)); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Phila-
delphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 366-67 (3d Cir. 1975) (grant of summary judgment
before adjudication of defendant's counterclaim not properly certifiable under Rule
54(b)). For a discussion of factors considered by courts in determining whether a given
order is appealable under Rule 54(b), see id. at 364.
38. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978) (rigidity would
sometimes conflict with purpose of § 1291); Dibella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 125-
26 (1962) (overly rigid insistence on finality defeats rule's purpose where appealed orders
are collateral); Frank, supra note 25, at 295 (noting Court's preference for practical con-
struction of the finality rule); see also Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S.
507, 517-18 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (advocating flexible approach to finality require-
ment such that appellate courts review all cases where question of finality is close and can
be answered either way by equally persuasive arguments).
39. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
1987] ATTORNEY'S FEES ISSUES
over the shoulders of their colleagues at the trial level, usurping the trial
judges' role as finder and interpreter of facts." The Court, however, sel-
dom has relied on this policy, justifying the finality rule most often on the
ground that it prevents piecemeal review.4"
II. THE FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS INVOLVING UNRESOLVED
ATrORNEY'S FEES ISSUES
A. Collateral/Integral Distinction: Proper Treatment of Fee Awards
that are Akin to Damages
Distinguishing fee awards integral to the merits from those that are
collateral best serves the policies behind the final judgment rule. Because
integral awards closely resemble compensatory damages, 2 courts must
treat them differently than collateral awards to avoid frustr'ating the poli-
cies supporting the finality requirement, which favor appeal of the judg-
ment on the merits and the assessment of damages in one proceeding.43
The case-by-case method of determining finality when attorney's fees
questions are unresolved is necessary when fee issues are so intertwined
with the merits of a case as to constitute a part of the damages.' For
example, when the agreement at issue in a breach of contract action con-
tains a provision requiring the breaching party to pay the other party's
attorney's fees in any action for breach,4 5 the fee award is a stipulated
part of the damages," tantamount to a liquidated damages clause.4 7
Similarly, fee-shifting provisions in certain statutes are connected so
40. See Firestone Tire & Rubber, 449 U.S. at 374. Further, the Coopers & Lybrand
Court expressed its concern that permitting an appellate court to review a non-final judg-
ment would result in the improper involvement of appellate courts in the trial process.
See 437 U.S. at 476.
41. See Green, supra note 1, at 214-15.
42. See infra, notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
43. See infra, notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
44. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir.
1987); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 439 (arguing for general inclusion of attorney's
fees in damage awards).
45. See e.g, Ierna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1476 (11th Cir. 1987);
C.I.T. Corp. v. Nelson, 743 F.2d 774, 775 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Oxford Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Duckworth, 689 F.2d 587, 588 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. See F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 776 F.2d 1563, 1563-64 (2d
Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Oxford, 689 F.2d at 589; see also Ierna v. Arthur Murray Int'l,
Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 & n.5 (I th Cir. 1987) (contractually stipulated fees are
designed to compensate for the injury).
47. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir.
1987). In his dissent from Beckwith Mach., Judge Gibbons points out that the case did
not involve breach of an agreement that included a clause providing for liability for attor-
ney's fees. Id at 293 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons stressed that fees had
been awarded pursuant to either common law or state statute and thus were not properly
viewed as integral to the merits. Id. at 293 (Gibbons, C.I., dissenting). The majority
nonetheless concluded that expenses incurred by plaintiff in hiring counsel resulted di-
rectly from defendant insurer's breach of the insurance contract by failing to defend
plaintiff in a separate liability action. See id at 290. The court concluded that because
the jury would have awarded attorney's fees as part of the damages in the suit against the
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closely to the substantive statutory provisions that the fees form part of
the damages.48 For example, attorney's fees awarded under the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act in "exceptional circumstances"4 9 are intended to "make
whole" the prevailing party.5° In such cases, appeal of a judgment on the
issue of liability before the trial court has resolved fee questions, which is
permissible under the bright-line rule, amounts to an appeal on the mer-
its before the court has assessed damages." The Supreme Court ex-
pressly has disapproved of this result, reasoning that the appeal of a
judgment as to liability before the trial court calculates damages frus-
trates the policy behind section 1291.52
Courts following the bright-line rule reject any need for the collateral/
integral distinction, maintaining that questions of attorney's fees, akin to
costs, always raise issues collateral to the merits. 3 Some of these courts
rely heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in White v. New Hampshire
Department of Employment Security54 to support their argument.5 5 In
defendant, "the fee award [formed] an integral part of the damage award and [arose]
directly out of the initial determination of liability." Id.
48. See, eg., Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 682 F.2d 1143, 1144, 1147 (5th
Cir. 1982) (fees awarded pursuant to Jones Act), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983); Hair-
line Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 1981) (fees awarded under
Lanham Act); see also Jaffe v. Sundowner Properties, Inc., 808 F.2d 1425, 1427 (11 th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (fees awarded under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) as a sanction for failure to
comply with discovery requests held not similar to costs).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1982).
50. See Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-b-Que Restaurant, 771 F.2d 521, 524
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
51. In Holmes, an action under the Jones Act for failure of the employer to provide
maintenance and cure to plaintiff, the court stated: "We simply cannot distinguish this
case from any other judgment of liability that leaves undetermined the relief as to the
amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. The policies against piecemeal ap-
peals apply fully to such a situation; they are also applicable here." Holmes v. J. Ray
McDermott & Co., 682 F.2d 1143, 1148 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
52. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976) (summary judg-
ment only as to liability "where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief re-
mains to be resolved have never been considered to be 'final' Within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1291" (citation omitted)).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Estridge, 797 F.2d 1454, 1459 (8th Cir. 1986) (Lay,
C.J.); Bernstein v. Menard, 728 F.2d 252, 253 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Budinich v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155, 157 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) ("attorney's fees mo-
tions [are] procedural equivalents and uniformly require separate notices of appeal when
such motions are resolved after judgment has been rendered on the merits"), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987).
54. 455 U.S. 445 (1982). In White, the plaintiff had prevailed at trial in an action
alleging the defendant's discriminatory failure to determine certain unemployment com-
pensation entitlements in a timely manner. Id. at 447. The plaintiff moved for attorney's
fees under § 1988 four-and-one-half months after the district court had entered judgment
in accordance with the parties' consent decree. Id. at 447-48. Claiming that had it
known that the consent decree would not fix its total liability it would have eschewed
settlement, the defendant won reversal of the fees award on appeal to the First Circuit.
See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 699 & n.2 (1st
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 445 (1982). The court of appeals reasoned that Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) applied to motions for attorney's fees and hence, ruled plaintiff's motion untimely
since it was made more than ten days following the judgment. 629 F.2d at 700.
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White, the Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which
requires that motions to amend a judgment be filed within ten days of
entry of a final judgment, does not apply to motions for attorney's fees
under section 1988 of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976 ("sec-
tion 1988)56 because such motions involve issues collateral to the merits
and do not constitute motions to amend the judgment.57 Relying on the
White Court's statement that requests for section 1988 fees are "uniquely
separable" from the cause of action,18 proponents of the bright-line rule
infer that the Supreme Court intends that attorney's fees issues be treated
as collateral in every case.59 One court, although recognizing that White
applied expressly only to requests for fees under section 1988, found
nothing in the decision to indicate the Supreme Court's intent to distin-
55. See, eg., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155, 157-58 (10th Cir.
1986) (per curiam) cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987); Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757
F.2d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 1985); Bernstein v. Menard, 728 F.2d 252, 253 (4th Cir. 1984);
Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 26-27 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1983).
The appellant in Budinich argued that because the issue of whether fees represent an
integral part of relief is a matter of state law, a bright-line rule may violate the principles
set forth in Erie R.R1 v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), where state law allows a party to
appeal the merits and fee issues in the same proceeding when fee issues are determined
after the judgment on the merits. Budinich, 807 F.2d at 158. The court in Budinich,
however, rejected this argument, holding that although the relationship of fees to the
merits implicates substantive law, governed by state law under Erie, the specification of
time for filing an appeal is a matter of procedure. Thus, under Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 471-75 (1965), federal law should control. Budinich, 807 F.2d at 158. In es-
sence, the court held that whether it should apply the bright-line or case-by-case ap-
proach is a matter of the law of the particular circuit. Id
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Budinich, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987), and
heard oral argument on March 21, 1988. The question presented to the Court was
whether, under Erie, its opinion in White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec.,
455 U.S. 445, 454 (1982), holding that attorney's fees authorized by federal statute are
collateral, applies to diversity cases wherecstate law deems such fees integral. In deciding
the Erie issue, the Court may address whether the White decision mandates application of
the bright-line rule or whether it should be limited to its facts. Its opinion also may
decide the main issue of the propriety of the collateral/integral distinction. See Respon-
dent's Brief at 20-25.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Section 1988 provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985 and 1986 of [Title 42], Title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et
seq.], or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id; see also Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980)
(discussing purpose behind § 1988), aff'd, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
57. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450-54
(1982).
58. Id at 452. The Court reasoned that since § 1988 fees are not compensation for
the cause of action, but are "uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at
trial," they could not be characterized as an element of relief, indistinguishable from
other elements. Id. Thus, the Court's use of the phrase, "uniquely separable" (emphasis
added) in describing the relationship of § 1988 fees to the merits of an action further
supports an inference that the Court did not intend to treat all attorney's fees awards
alike.
59. See cases cited supra note 98.
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guish other types of attorney's fees as integral.6°
These courts, however, interpret White too broadly. 6' The White
Court held only that motions for section 1988 attorney's fees are collat-
eral for Rule 59(e) purposes, relying specifically on the policies underly-
ing the statute and the Rule.62 The drafters of Rule 59(e) intended the
Rule to permit a district court to reconsider matters properly encom-
passed in a decision on the merits in order to rectify its own mistakes
during the period immediately following judgment. 63 In addition, Con-
gress enacted section 1988 to facilitate redress by private parties under
federal civil rights laws.' 4 Because a court may not award section 1988
fees until a party has prevailed at trial,65 determinations under this sec-
tion require an inquiry wholly beyond the scope of the merits. 6 Thus,
the White Court held that section 1988 fee requests fall outside the scope
of Rule 59(e).6 7
The collateral nature of a section 1988 fee award distinguishes it from
other federal statutes whose fee-shifting provisions relate closely to the
statutes' substantive provisions, 68 thus mandating the collateral/integral
60. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155, 158 (10th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987).
At least two bright-line courts have found implicit approval of the bright-line rule in
the White Court's citation, 455 U.S. at 452 n.14, to Memphis Sheraton Corp. v. Kirkley,
614 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1980). See Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 792, 794
(6th Cir. 1985); Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1983). The court in
Kirkley held that a judgment on the merits was final although contractually based fees
remained unquantified. 614 F.2d at 133.
The reliance on the White Court's citation of Kirkley, however, is misplaced. The
Court in White merely cited that case as support for its holding that § 1988 fees could be
found collateral for purposes of Rule 59(e). See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Em-
ployment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 452-53 & n. 14 (1982). Nothing in White indicates that the
Court intended to hold that the contractual fees addressed in Kirkley could not be inte-
gral to the merits for finality purposes.
61. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir.
1987).
62. See White, 455 U.S. at 450-52.
63. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 5 F.R.D. 436,
476 (1946); id. at 450-51; see also Metcalf v. Borba, 681 F.2d 1183, 1184-85 (9th Cir.
1982) (following White's reading of Rule 59(e) as applied to § 1988 attorney's fees).
64. See Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1348 (9th Cir.
1980), (citing S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News at 5908; H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)), aff'd, 458
U.S. 457 (1982).
65. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451-52
(1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
66. See White, 455 U.S. at 451-52.
67. See id. at 452. Arguably, § 1988 attorney's fees may be integral to the merits in
contexts other than Rule 59(e) because the court awards fees in its discretion, presumably
basing its decision on the underlying facts of the case. Such fees are more properly
viewed as collateral, however, because the award is nearly presumptive and is only denied
under special circumstances where the award would be unjust. See Newman v. Piggie
Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
68. See Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652, 659-60 (7th Cir. 1981). The
Hairline Creations court recognized the uniquely collateral nature of a § 1988 attorney's
fees award. See Hairline Creations, 664 F.2d at 659-60 (7th Cir. 1981). That court distin-
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distinction. Although at least one case has found this distinction too
"metaphysical," 69 other courts have disagreed. 0  In the past, the
Supreme Court has recognized a distinction between various fee-shifting
provisions based on their functions in the litigation process.7 For exam-
ple, the Court has held that a request for fees out of a common fund
created pursuant to a class action is collateral to the merits.' The Court
reasoned that the creation of the fund itself determines the defendant's
full liability and that questions as to what portion of that fund would pay
for attorneys fall wholly beyond the issues of liability.73 In another case,
guished § 1988 fees from fees awarded under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, holding that
a Lanham Act fee award requires consideration of issues intertwined with the merits.
Because such fees are integral to the merits, requests for fees constitute a motion to
amend the judgment within the scope of Rule 59(e). Id at 660.
The court in Exchange National Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1985), ques-
tioned the validity of Hairline Creations in light of the holding in White. See Daniels, 763
F.2d at 293-94. The Daniels court did not overrule Hairline Creations, however, prefer-
ring instead to limit it to trade-mark cases. Id. at 294. Arguably, in doing so, the Daniels
court recognized the existence of at least one category of fees integral to the merits of an
action, thereby undermining its own rejection of the collateral/integral distinction.
69. See Daniels, 763 F.2d at 293. The court stated:
We reject as altogether too metaphysical the distinction between fees that are
"compensation for injury" and those that are not. All awards of fees make the
prevailing party better off. Whether this benefit is "really" a way to compensate
for the underlying hurt or instead a way to reduce the cost of litigation, thus
making redress of the underlying hurt more likely and leaving the prevailing
party with a greater net award, is a question of semantics rather than substance.
Resolution of this question would depend on the legislative (or bargaining) his-
tory of a given statute or contract-if indeed such a question ever has a sensible
answer.
Id
70. See Ierna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1475 & n.5 (11th Cir.
1987); Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1987).
The court in lerna rejected the concept that all attorney's fees awards are alike insofar as
they all benefit the prevailing party, stating: "We believe that there is a difference between
an award of attorneys' fees that is designed to compensate for the injury, and an award
that reduces the costs of seeking compensation through litigation." lerna, 833 F.2d at
1475 n.5. The court, however, should have gone further in assailing the Daniels court's
position. Although the Daniels court rejected the case-by-case approach merely because
it requires individual case analysis, the court failed to address the possibility that the
complexity of the case-by-case approach might be justified by other policies, such as the
avoidance of piecemeal review.
71. Compare Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (fees awarded in
admiralty suit, for maintenance and cure, compensate plaintiff for harm suffered) with
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478-81 (1980) (fees awarded under common
fund doctrine intended to reduce unjust enrichment of those who benefit from a class
action without contributing to its cost). In light of such distinctions, it is unlikely that
the Court in White intended to rule that all attorney's fees are collateral for finality
purposes.
72. See Boeing Co., 444 U.S. at 481 n.7. The common fund doctrine rests on the
notion that those receiving the benefit of a class action recovery, in the form of a claim to
a common fund established by the losing party, are unjustly enriched if they have not
contributed to the cost of the suit. See id. at 478. The doctrine allows attorneys to re-
cover their fees from the fund so that each beneficiary of the suit pays a portion of the
attorney's fees proportionate to his claim to the fund. Id.
73. See id. at 479-80 & n.5.
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however, the Court held that attorney's fees formed an essential part of
the damages suffered by a seaman in a suit for maintenance and cure,
reasoning that the attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff in pursuing his
claim directly resulted from his employer's failure to provide assistance
to plaintiff during his illness. 4
Further, in various situations, fees have been included in awards of
damages,75 despite general resistance to overturning the American rule,
which traditionally disallows recovery of attorney's fees as damages."6
The Fifth Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's lead, finding fees to
be included in damages for failure of maintenance and cure under the
Jones Act." In a contract context, the same court held that reasonable
attorney's fees comprise part of the foreseeable damages recoverable for
breach of the warranty of workmanlike performance.7" In addition, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has found a com-
mon law exception to the non-recovery aspect of the American rule when
one party seeks fees for litigation against a third party, provided such
74. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). The requirement that an
employer provide maintenance and cure affords an injured or ill seaman food and shelter
for the duration of his incapacitation sustained through his work. See Vaughan, 369 U.S.
at 531. The primary rationale behind imposing such a duty on shipowners is to maintain
a commercial and military merchant marine and to induce persons to accept seaman's
work. Id. (quoting Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938)).
75. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 763 F.2d 745, 751 (5th Cir.
1985); see also Answering Serv., Inc. v. Egan, 728 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(award of fees from third party because of defendant's tortious conduct).
76. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263-64 (1975)
(Court, absent congressional authorization, declined to create common law "private at-
torney general" exception to American rule to make prosecution of federal civil rights
claims more feasible).
One commentator argues persuasively that attorney's fees should be included in dam-
age calculations in general. See Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 440. Professor Leubsdorf
suggests that damages not including fees are adequate only if society is concerned with
what the defendant pays, rather than what the plaintiff receives. See id. at 442-43.
Clearly, such concern confficts with the traditional view of damages as compensation to
the plaintiff. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 4, at 20 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing general compensatory function of tort
law).
77. See Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 682 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983). Citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530
(1962), the Holmes court noted that a defendant who arbitrarily and willfully refused to
pay maintenance and cure would be liable for attorney's fees as part of the "necessary
expenses" incurred by the plaintiff. See Holmes, 682 F.2d at 1147. Thus, impliedly, a
merely negligent defendant might not be so liable. Insofar as a fee award would be con-
tingent in part on the degree of the defendant's willfulness, fee questions in a maintenance
and cure action are "subsumed by the merits." Id.
78. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Turbine Serv., Inc., 763 F.2d 745, 751 (5th Cir.
1985). In Strachan Shipping Co. v. Koninklyke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maalschappy,
N.V., 324 F.2d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 954 (1964), a stevedore was
held liable to a shipowner for breach of warranty of workmanlike performance. The
shipowner recovered attorney's fees incurred in defending a longshoreman's suit as an
element of the damages because the stevedore's breach "in all likelihood exposed the
shipowner to liability." Id.
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litigation is neccesitated by the defendant's wrongful acts? 9 Because
such fees fall within the scope of damage relief, courts should adopt the
case-by-case analysis of determining the finality of a judgment reserving
fee issues for later consideration. Application of the general bright-line
rule to such fees improperly results in appeal of a judgment on liability
before determination of damages.8"
One court following the case-by-case method has noted the difficulty of
deciding when an award of attorney's fees is integral to the merits of a
case." Indeed, courts applying the case-by-case approach offer little gui-
dance on how to distinguish integral fees from collateral fees.8" A test,
however, is easily devised by focusing the inquiry on the function of a fee
award, rather than on the source of the award. A difference exists be-
tween awards of attorney's fees intended to compensate for the underly-
ing injury and awards designed to facilitate redress of the injury by
reducing litigation costs.83 An integral, or compensatory attorney's fees
award is made as part of the "initial determination of liability" and
requires the court to consider the very factors that bear upon the decision
as to which party prevails. A collateral award, on the other hand, such
as one under § 1988, is made as a matter of course to the victorious
party,85 without regard to the underlying issues of the case.
Where a party alleges that the expenditure of attorney's fees forms a
part of his injury, such as where the defendant insurer's breach of duty to
defend the plaintiff forced the plaintiff to hire his own attorney in a liabil-
ity action,86 or where a union's breach of its duty of fair representation
79. See Answering Serv., Inc. v. Egan, 728 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defend-
ant liable for fees in "wrongful involvement in litigation" action, where plaintiff forced to
defend third party action proximately caused by defendant's misrepresentation concern-
ing sale of plaintiff's stock). In Scott v. Local Union 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 548
F.2d 1244, 1246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977), the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that an award of attorney's fees forms part of the damages assessed in
an action for breach of a union's duty of fair representation. After noting that the
Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262
(1975), see supra note 2 and accompanying text, reaffirmed the American rule of non-
recoverability of attorney's fees in federal litigation, the Scott court distinguished Alyeska,
stating: "We do not read [Alyeska] as in any way affecting those cases in which the
attorney fees are not an award to the successful litigant in the case at hand, but rather are
the subject of the law suit itself" Scott, 548 F.2d at 1246 (emphasis added).
80. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
81. See Cobb v. Miller, 818 F.2d 1227, 1236 n.12 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Exchange
Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1985) (resolution of question whether
fees are collateral or integral may never have sensible answer).
82. See, eg., Cobb, 818 F.2d at 1236 n.12; Jackson Marine Corp. v. Harvey Barge
Repair, Inc., 794 F.2d 989, 991 (5th Cir. 1986); Donaldson v. Clark, 786 F.2d 1570,
1574-75 (1lth Cir.), vacated, 794 F.2d 572 (1986) (en banc); McQurter v. City of Atlanta,
724 F.2d 881, 882 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
83. See Ierna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 n.5 (I th Cir.
1987).
84. Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1987).
85. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
86. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 287 (3d Cir.
1987).
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causes an employee to seek private counsel, 87 the fees are integrally re-
lated to the merits. Conversely, where the fee award is statutorily au-
thorized, for example, as a means of encouraging private enforcement of
civil rights laws88 or to punish an attorney's carelessness89 or bad faith,
the fees are collateral.
B. Case-by-Case Approach Accords with Finality Policy
Applying the case-by-case method of determining whether a judgment
on the merits is final and appealable when fee issues remain unresolved
reduces piecemeal review,9" thereby promoting the central policy under-
lying the final judgment rule.91 When attorney's fees are integral to the
merits of an action, requiring a party to await fee determination before
appealing the judgment on the merits properly allows the appellate court
to consider the issues of liability and fees in one proceeding. 92 This result
87. See Scott v. Local Union 377, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 548 F.2d 1244, 1246 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977).
88. See Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1348 (9th Cir.
1980), aff'd, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5908, 5910 (legislative history to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988) ("civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fees awards
have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity
to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain").
89. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir.
1985), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
90. See Ierna v. Arthur Murray Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472, 1475 & n.3 (1 th Cir.
1987); Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1987);
C.I.T. Corp. v. Nelson, 743 F.2d 774, 775 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984).
91. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
92. See Union Tank Car Co. v. Isbrandtsen, 416 F.2d 96, 97 (2d Cir. 1969) (per
curiam); see also Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1985)
(adopting bright-line rule but recognizing that single appeal raising multiple issues pro-
motes judicial economy to a greater degree than multiple appeals); cf Rodriguez v.
Handy, 802 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1986) (consolidating appeal of order awarding fees
with appeal of order quantyifying fee award avoids piecemeal review); Fort v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 746 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1984) (same).
In both Rodriguez and Fort, the appellant sought review of the order granting unquan-
tified fees, rather than review of the judgment on the merits. Rodriguez, 802 F.2d at 820-
21; Fort, 746 F.2d at 747. Both courts distinguished the situation at bar from a case in
which a party appeals the judgment on the merits prior to determination of fee issues.
Rodriguez, 802 F.2d at 820-21; Fort, 746 F.2d at 747 n.6. Finding it unnecessary to
decide whether the fees at issue were integral or collateral to the merits, these courts held
that no award of attorney's fees may be appealed before the amount is determined. See
Rodriguez, 802 F.2d at 821; Fort, 746 F.2d at 747.
The reasons supporting the requirement that full liability for fees be determined before
appeal apply whether a party seeks to appeal the judgment on the merits or the order
granting fees prior to quantification of the fees. In cases where attorney's fees are integral
to the merits of an action, an appeal of the judgment on the merits before fees are quanti-
fied virtually amounts to an appeal of such judgment before the court determines dam-
ages. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. Because damages are considered
part of the merits, such a result undermines the policy of preventing piecemeal review
that underlies the finality requirement. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S.
737, 744-46 (1976). Similarly, an appeal of an unquantified fee award itself is tantamount
to an appeal of a liability determination before damages have been computed. See Rodri-
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benefits parties by reducing the harrassment of successive appeals, which
threatens effective review of meritorious claims,93 and by allowing parties
to decide whether to appeal based on whether they received the relief for
which they sued.94 Moreover, because integral fee issues are so inter-
twined with the merits of a case and the scope of relief, a separate appeal
on the fee award requires the appellate court to conduct a detailed in-
quiry into the merits.95 Such an inquiry duplicates the work of the first
appellate tribunal, thereby wasting judicial resources.
Proponents of the bright-line rule, however, have questioned the desir-
ability of unitary review of fees and merits under the case-by-case ap-
proach. 96 These courts maintain that combining fee issues and merits in
one appeal is inappropriate. Such unified review harms parties whose
property and other interests may be bound up in litigation for long peri-
ods by requiring them to await the court's fee determination before ap-
pealing substantive issues.97 This argument applies particularly to a
defendant subject to a coercive remedy that is not appealable under the
collateral order doctrine,9" such as a civil contempt order, or an interloc-
utory order,99 because such a defendant may suffer irreparable harm
through delay."° The argument fails, however, because Congress, in cre-
ating specific exceptions to the final judgment rule for circumstances in
guez, 802 F.2d at 821. Courts have distinguished the situation in which the judgment on
the merits is appealed before the fees are quantified from the situation in which the un-
quantified award of fees itself is appealed. See id.; Fort, 746 F.2d at 747 n.6; see also
Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 1985) ("An award of attorneys'
fees is collateral to a decision on the merits, but a determination of the amount of attor-
neys' fees is not collateral to a determination of liability for attorneys' fees.") The two
situations are similar, however, insofar as both involve an appeal of a judgment on a
portion of the merits prior to the judgment as to all of the merits.
93. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
94. Cf Giordano v. Roudebush, 565 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(plaintiff bases decision to appeal on whether he receives relief he seeks).
95. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir.
1987); Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1981); see also
Crossman v. Maccoccio, 792 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (single appeal desir-
able where propriety of fee award is closely intertwined with merits and appellate court
must consider reasonableness of hours spent on litigation (dictum)).
96. See International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron-
workers' Local Union No. 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1982) (en
banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
97. See Halderman, 673 F.2d at 636; Note, Procedure: Effect of Attorney Fees on
Finality of Judgment-Amendment to Rule L11(c), 40 Okla. L. Rev. 145, 152 (1987)
(discussion limited to Oklahoma state law).
98. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 54647 (1949); Stringfel-
low v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct. 1177, 1181-82 (1987); supra notes 35-
36 and accompanying text.
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982); see also supra note 34-36 and accompanying
text (giving examples of orders appealable and not appealable under § 1291(a)(1) and
Cohen rule).
100. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir.
1982) (en banc) (unappealability of civil contempt order, under which some defendants
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which delaying appeal might irreparably harm parties' rights,"0° contem-
plated the full range of exceptions allowed."c2 Thus, appellate courts
must defer to Congress and should not expand these categories absent
congressional authorization.10 3 Moreover, while in most cases parties
would prefer expeditious appeal of non-final judgments,"° the policies
surrounding the finality requirement, particularly the avoidance of piece-
meal review, prohibit this. These policies should not be subverted by
indiscriminate appellate court action. 105
are incarcerated, pending fee determination causes irreparable consequences), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
Civil contempt orders, however, are appealable in certain situations. In United States
Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass'n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 1269, 1270-71 (3d Cir. 1979),
appellants sought review of a civil contempt order, issued for violation of an injunction.
The court held that the order was unappealable but stated in dictum that a party could
appeal such an order when the court has sought to punish the contemnor or coerce him
into compliance with the injunction. See id. at 1273; see also In re Arthur Treacher's
Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir. 1982) (civil contempt appealable
because issued in conjunction with appealable order).
101. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949); 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982); Fed R. Civ. P. 54(b); supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
102. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 746 (1976). Congress excepted
from the final judgment rule only certain interlocutory orders, such as injunctions. Id. at
744-46; see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
103. See Liberty Mutual, 424 U.S. at 746 (1976). The Court in Liberty Mutual, hold-
ing that summary judgment only as to liability in a Title VII action is unappealable,
wrote:
We believe that Congress, in enacting present §§ 1291 and 1292 of Title 28, has
been well aware of the dangers of an overly rigid insistence upon a "final deci-
sion" for appeal in every case, and has in those sections made ample provision
for appeal of orders which are not "final" so as to alleviate any possible hard-
ship. We would twist the fabric of the statute more than it will bear if we were
to agree that the District Court's order... was appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
1d; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263-64 (1975)
(where Congress has created specific provisions for shifting fees, judicial creation of com-
mon law "private-attorney-general" exception to American rule would violate Congress'
will).
One could argue that the Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949), created a judicial exception to the final judgment rule by
establishing the collateral order doctrine. The Court, however, based its decision on a
practical construction of the final judgment statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Cohen, 337
U.S. at 546; supra notes 26, 38 and accompanying texts. This Note attempts to show that
to allow immediate appeal of a judgment on the merits pending determination of fee
issues is impractical in cases where fees are integral to the merits. Thus, even though one
may argue that, in some situations, such as in Cohen, practical construction of the finality
requirement dictates appealability of a certain type of "non-final" order, a judgment on
the merits pending fee determination is not such an order.
104. See Rodriguez v. Handy, 802 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Crick, The
Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539, 539 (1932) ("Decisions of the trial
court from which counsel will wish to appeal may occur, of course, in many stages of the
case. It may be a ruling relating to service of process or an order with regard to the
pleadings.").
105. See Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, No. 87-1827, slip op. at 11 (1st Cir. March 11,
1988) (to review non-final interlocutory order because reversal would expedite case "un-
dermines" final judgment rule); Rodriguez, 802 F.2d at 821 (appeal of fee award prior to
A TTORNEY'S FEES ISSUES
The case-by-case approach also reduces the burden of cases before ap-
pellate tribunals by diminishing the number of appeals and promoting
settlement in cases in which the award of attorney's fees forms a major
portion of the total monetary judgment.1 6 Forcing the district court
judge to determine a party's entitlement to, as well as the amount of, an
integral fee award prior to appeal often requires the judge to reconsider
the merits of the case.107 This is especially true because most courts con-
sider the novelty and difficulty of the issues litigated in quantifying attor-
ney's fees. 108 Upon this further reflection, the trial judge might conclude
that an award of attorney's fees is not warranted."°9 Thus, when attor-
ney's fees otherwise would have constituted the bulk of a monetary judg-
ment, the district court's refusal to grant fees often will induce a losing
party to forgo a costly appeal. 110 Even if the district court, after its fur-
ther consideration, awards the prevailing party substantial attorney's
fees, the losing party might prefer to reach a fee settlement rather than
risk having the fee award affirmed after a protracted, expensive appeal.'
Last, requiring the trial judge to determine integral fee issues comports
with the policy behind the finality rule favoring appellate court deference
to the factfinding judgments of the trial judge."'
Advocates of the bright-line rule, however, maintain that requiring
trial courts to resolve integral fee issues prior to appeal will produce in-
creased, wasteful litigation.1 3 Courts that apply the bright-line rule con-
tend that if a party is not allowed an immediate appeal of a judgment on
determining quantity of fees "abolish[es] the limitations on appellate jurisdiction"); Fort
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 746 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1984) (appeal of fee award before
quantification contravenes policies supporting the final judgment rule).
106. Cf Rodriguez v. Handy, 802 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding unquantified
fee award non-appealable but using reasoning applicable to issue of appealability ofjudg-
ments on the merits leaving integral fee issues unresolved); Fort, 746 F.2d at 748 (same);
see also supra note 92 (discussing application of reasoning in Rodriguez and Fort to deci-
sion whether to apply case-by-case approach or bright-line rule).
107. See Fort, 746 F.2d at 748. The court in Fort noted that the avoidance of appeals
on issues that might otherwise be mooted once the district court has decided the entire
case is a primary policy underlying the finality rule. Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)).
108. See Fort v. Roadway Express, Inc., 746 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1984). For a list
of factors commonly used by courts to calculate fee awards, see Johnson v. Georgia High-
way Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). In addition, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-106 (1980) lists the novelty and difficulty of issues liti-
gated among the factors for attorneys to consider in billing their clients.
109. See Fort, 746 F.2d at 748.
110. See Rodriguez v. Handy, 802 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1986); Fort, 746 F.2d at 748.
111. See Rodriguez, 802 F.2d at 821. In addition, the prevailing party to whom fees
are awarded likely will settle to avoid reversal or reduction on appeal. See id.; Fort, 746
F.2d at 748.
112. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir.
1987) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental
& Reinforcing Ironworkers' Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656, 658-59
(9th Cir. 1984); C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3915,
at 313 (1987 Supp.) [hereinafter Wright].
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the merits, courts will have to engage unnecessarily in the time-consum-
ing process of awarding or quantifying fees, which could have been
averted had the judgment been reversed on early appeal. I 4 This result,
however, exceeds the limits on appellate jurisdiction." 5 Although
prompt reversal of many district court orders would terminate the
case," 6 this does not convert an otherwise non-final judgment into one
that is appealable." 7 Further, most trial court judgments that are ap-
pealed are affirmed, rather than reversed."" Thus, the probability that
final disposition of fees and merits at the trial level would lead parties to
either forgo appeals of low fee awards, or settle where awards are high,' 19
outweighs the possibility that the trial court would not have to resolve fee
issues because of subsequent reversal.
Courts applying the bright-line rule also assert that it fosters the clar-
ity120 appropriate for a jurisdictional rule.1 2' Proponents of the bright-
line rule criticize the case-by-case approach on the ground that it will
yield uncertainty among courts and litigants.' 22 The case-by-case ap-
proach would spawn a whole new body of law to determine when a judg-
ment on the merits is final where fee questions are undecided, thereby
unnecessarily expending judicial resources. 23 Courts and commentators
further argue that litigants and courts will have difficulty in successfully
114. See Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1983); Memphis Sheraton
Corp. v. Kirkley, 614 F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1980); see also Beckwith Mach., 815 F.2d at
292 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting); Note, supra note 13, at 610.
115. See Rodriguez v. Handy, 802 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1986).
116. See id.; Fort v. Roadway Express, Inc., 746 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1984).
117. See Rodriguez v. Handy, 802 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1986). See generally Moore,
supra note 27, 110.07, at 108-09 (listing non-appealable orders typically issued in course
of litigation).
118. In 1984-85, only 15.9 percent of all appeals terminated on the merits were re-
versed. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts 261 (1985).
119. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155, 157 (10th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 763
F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815
F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 1987) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting majority's application
of case-by-case approach in favor of clarity offered by bright-line rule).
121. See Beckwith Mach., 815 F.2d at 292 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting); Daniels, 763
F.2d at 293; Wright, supra note 113, § 3915, at 313-14:
[A clear rule] will forestall any need to worry whether a judgment that fails to
pass upon a demand for fees in the complaint is not final, in the way that judg-
ments that fail to dispose of all requests for relief are not final .... Complex
rules of appellate jurisdiction provide fertile occasion for argument, and too
often are overlooked by the parties or even deliberately ignored.
Id.
122. See Beckwith Mach., 815 F.2d at 292 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting); Budinich v. Bec-
ton Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155, 157 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert granted, 108
S. Ct. 226 (1987); see also International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Rein-
forcing Ironworkers' Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir.
1984) ("The [bright-line] rule provides counsel with a device for anticipating the future;
the [case-by-case] approach merely encourages counsel to make an educated guess.").
123. See Madison Indus., 733 F.2d at 658-59.
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distinguishing integral from collateral fee awards'24 in light of the widely
divergent reasoning offered by courts that draw the distinction.125 As a
result, attorneys will be forced to file a cautionary appeal following a
judgment on the merits to avoid potential unfair dismissal of a later ap-
peal on untimeliness grounds should the fees be deemed collateral. 26
Such a cautionary appeal must be dismissed for prematurity, thus wast-
ing judicial resources. 27
When the district court, however, decides integral fee issues within a
few days or weeks of the substantive issues, the court of appeals, rather
than dismissing the cautionary appeal as premature, 28 may consolidate
it with a timely appeal filed after the trial court has resolved the fee is-
sue. 2 9 In addition, filing a second appeal after the trial court has made
its fee determination is unnecessary because the court's issuance of the
appealable order cures the prematurity of the first notice and permits a
single appeal13 0 as long as neither party is prejudiced.' 3' Thus, even
124. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir.
1987) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 293
(7th Cir. 1985); see also Wright, supra note 113, § 3915, at 313 (clear rule would avoid
need to worry whether judgment failing to rule on fee issues is final).
125. Compare the following rationales offered by courts following the case-by-case
analysis for finding attorney's fees awards integral to the merits: Beckwith Mach., 815
F.2d at 290 & n.7 (fees integral because jury would award fees as part of damages); Jafe
v. Sundowner Properties, Inc., 808 F.2d 1425, 1427 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d), sanction of fee award and sanction of dismissal each rest on same
factual basis); F.H. Krear & Co., v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 776 F.2d 1563, 1564 (2d
Cir. 1985) (contractually stipulated fees are integral); C.I.T. Corp. v. Nelson, 743 F.2d
774, 775 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding contractually stipulated fees are "'compensation for
the injury giving rise to an action,'" (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employ-
ment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 452 (1982))); Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc.,
731 F.2d 1160, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1984) (fees integral to merits under civil RICO statute
because statute creating cause of action provides for both damage award and fee award;
fee award under statute is mandatory; defendant has no opportunity to recover fees, thus
fees are unlike costs); see also Hairline Creations, Inc. v. Kefalas, 664 F.2d 652, 659-60
(7th Cir. 1981) (fees collateral for Rule 59(e) purposes where statute designates them part
of "costs").
126. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir.
1987) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental
& Reinforcing Ironworkers' Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th
Cir. 1984); see also West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1983) ("careful appellate
advocate will file two appeals in each case where attorney fee adjudication is implicated"
(emphasis in original)); see also Bronze Shelds, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Civil Serv.,
667 F.2d 1074, 1079 (3d Cir. 1981) (recognizing wisdom of filing cautionary appeal after
fee determination because appeal on merits before fee determination must be dismissed as
premature (citing Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc))), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982).
127. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 292-93 (3d Cir.
1987) (Gibbons, CJ., dissenting); Wright, supra note 113, § 3905, at 422 (1st ed. 1976).
128. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
129. See Alcom County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1163-66 (5th
Cir. 1984) (court may consider premature appeal when judgment becomes final prior to
dismissal of such appeal).
130. See Norman v. Housing Authority, No. 87-7763, slip op. at 1354 (11th Cir. Feb.
1, 1988); Interstate Supplies, 731 F.2d at 1166. But see Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d
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when the district court delays fee determination, issuance of the fee order
cures the prematurity of the first appeal.'32
Further, the uncertainty inherent in this, as in any case-by-case analy-
sis, will cause only temporary inconvenience. 133 Because courts easily
may formulate guidelines to simplify the case-by-case analysis, 1 34 the
new body of law emerging from this approach will eradicate the initial
confusion as courts solidify their tests. 135 Moreover, the uncertainty that
accompanies any new rule of law is not sufficient justification to reject
such rules whenever their benefits outweigh the costs of uncertainty. The
value of the case-by-case approach to determining finality, in reducing
piecemeal appeals, far outweighs the virtue of the clarity of the bright-
line rule.13
6
One court has stated that unified review of fees and merits may be
undesirable, because it forces counsel to litigate issues regarding their
fees along with substantive issues, thus limiting their strategy of avoiding
fee discussions with their clients in the midst of a litigation. 37 To avoid
appearing overly concerned with payment, attorneys customarily await
the end of post-judgment motions before seeking fees.' 38 Requiring them
to do otherwise increases the inherent tension between counsel and client
regarding fees.
139
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the similar argument that
fee negotiations between opposing counsel should be delayed until after
1378, 1384 (1lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1979 (1987); West v. Keve, 721 F.2d
91, 94 (3d Cir. 1983).
131. See Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922-23 & n.6a (3d Cir. 1977).
132. See Norman v. Housing Authority, No. 87-7763, slip op. at 1354 (11th Cir. Feb.
1, 1988); Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, 731 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1984).
133. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 807 F.2d 155, 157 (10th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (case-by-case analysis would promote uncertainty "until an inclusive and coher-
ent set of principles could be worked out"), cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987); Wright,
supra note 113, § 3915, at 313 (case-by-case approach causes "period of uncertainty as
courts work through questions whether some grounds for recovering fees" are more or
less separable from the merits (emphasis added)).
134. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
135. See Budinich, 807 F.2d at 157 (adopting bright-line rule but recognizing tempo-
rary nature of uncertainty caused by case-by-case approach).
136. See Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 F.2d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir.
1987). The Beckwith Mach. court wrote:
[T]he value in having a bright-line rule is severely compromised when the gen-
erality of the rule masks important underlying differences-differences that un-
dermine the long-settled jurisdictional principle that appeals may be taken only
from orders that are final in that they have disposed of all parties and of all
issues. Permitting the fees award in a case such as this one to be treated sepa-
rately from the merits order of which it is a part can only lead to piecemeal
appeals-a practice long since renounced by every appellate court.
Id at 291.
137. See International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron-
workers' Local Union No. 75 v. Madison Indus., 733 F.2d 656, 659 (9th Cir. 1984).
138. See id.
139. See id.
[Vol. 56
ATTORNEY'S FEES ISSUES
the court issues a judgment on the merits."4 As with attorney-client fee
negotiations, such a delay protects the attorney-client relationship. Re-
quiring counsel to delay fee negotiations prevents conflicts of interest be-
tween plaintiffs seeking recovery of money damages and attorneys
concerned with the size of the fee portion of a settlement.1 41 While the
Court recognized that the prospect of receiving a certain fee might influ-
ence the professional judgment of an unethical attorney in deciding
whether to accept a settlement that is satisfactory to the client,'4 2 the
Court accorded greater weight to the defendant's need to ascertain the
full extent of his liability as early as possible, noting that ethical counsel
could successfully negotiate an appropriate fee settlement.' 43 Thus, re-
quiring an attorney to appeal fee issues and merits in the same proceed-
ing benefits the client, who prefers to learn as soon as possible whether he
must bear his own attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt the case-by-case analysis to determine whether a
judgment on the merits is final when attorney's fees are left unquantified.
While the bright-line rule has the advantage of clarity resulting in ease of
application, the tendency of the case-by-case method to reduce piecemeal
review outweighs this benefit. Further, insofar as the case-by-case ap-
proach may create temporary uncertainty, courts should focus on the
purpose for which they award fees. When fees are intended as a measure
of substantive relief, and are awarded as part of the initial determination
of liability, they are compensatory in nature, and thus, are integral.
When fees are awarded merely to reduce litigation costs without regard
to the underlying issues of the case, however, they are collateral. Apply-
ing these guidelines will allow courts to solidify their tests and restore
predictability to the case-by-case approach. Last, ample protection for
parties subject to irreparable harm by delay exists in the statutory and
judicial exceptions to the finality requirement. It is only through the
case-by-case approach that fee issues integral to a case will be reviewed
properly in conjunction with the merits rather than at another time, thus
furthering the ends of the finality requirement.
Richard S. Crummins
140. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453 n. 15
(1982).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. Moreover, the Supreme Court in White put faith in counsel to act in a
responsible manner. See id.
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